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FROM FEUDAL LAND CONTRACTS TO FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES:
THE TREATMENT OF STATUS THROUGH SPECIFIC RELIEF
JOHN J. CHUNG

I.

Introduction
In sorting through the aftermath of the global economic

collapse, one conclusion has emerged regarding its cause: Financial
derivatives were at the root of the crisis.' It is now widely believed,
with the obvious benefit of hindsight, that the failure to regulate
derivatives was responsible to a large extent for the collapse, and
calls for reform are echoing throughout the government.2 The failure
to adequately regulate derivatives is an issue that needs to be
addressed.
Derivatives did not grow out of control due to the absence of
legislative attention. Such a view would suggest that derivatives were
somehow overlooked by Congress in enacting financial legislation.
In fact, the exact opposite is true. Congress explicitly addressed
derivatives, and enacted legislation to benefit them through special
treatment. This treatment is seen in the Bankruptcy Code, among
other places. In bankruptcy, the non-debtor party to a derivative is
treated differently and better than other parties who have contracted
with the debtor. Unlike such other parties, the non-debtor party to a
derivative is permitted to exercise its rights under the derivatives
contract, notwithstanding the automatic stay and other bankruptcy
provisions. In other words, such a party is permitted to exercise the
contract exactly as written. Other non-debtor contractual parties are
often forced to accept a substitutionary form of relief. This begs the

*

Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law; B.A.,

Washington University in St. Louis; J.D., Harvard Law School.
1As one commentator observed: "The final months of 2008 marked the end
of an unprecedented saga of excess. The mania, panic, and crash had many
causes. But if you are looking for a single word to use in laying blame for
the recent financial catastrophe, there is only one choice. Derivatives."
FRANK PARTNOY,

F.I.A.S.C.O.,

BLOOD IN THE WATER ON WALL STREET

248 (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 2009) (1997).
2 See, e.g., Reuters, Geithner Seeks Clampdown on Derivatives Dealers,
CNBC, July 10, 2009, http://www.cnbc.com/id/31849274 (discussing U.S.
Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner's proposals for increased supervision of
the over-the-counter derivatives market).
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question: If derivatives are so dangerous, why are they afforded this
type of special treatment?
The limited right to specific relief on the contract, as
opposed to some other type of relief, is a concept introduced to
students in the first year of law school. A basic course in contract law
teaches that damages are the favored form of relief for breach of
contract and that specific performance is an extraordinary remedy.
Contracts for the sale of land are presented as the prototypical
example of the type of contract that may be enforced through specific
performance. So, why do land contracts and financial derivatives
share the common benefit of enforcement through specific relief?. Is
it mere coincidence, or is there a deeper commonality? The
commonly accepted understanding of land contracts is that each
parcel of land is unique, so money damages are inadequate to remedy
a breach.3 With regard to derivatives, the expressed reason for
favorable treatment (according to the legislative history) is that
derivatives require such treatment in order to avoid "systemic risk" to
the entire financial system. 4 Based on these stated reasons, one could
fairly conclude that any similarity in the treatment of the two types of
contracts is mere coincidence. This conclusion has intuitive appeal.
After all, the remedy of specific performance for land contracts was
developed in feudal England, while the treatment of derivatives is a
contemporary invention.
This article contends, however, that these expressed reasons
(while true up to a point) mask a deeper rationale that is common to
both types of contracts. The core reasons underlying the development
of specific performance of land contracts in feudal England are
essentially the same as the reasons underlying the favored treatment
of financial derivatives in the contemporary economy. The thesis of
this article is that both types of contracts have been singled out for
3 But to say that specific performance is available when the subject matter

of the contract is "unique" is simply a conclusion devoid of analysis.
Whether "uniqueness" has any meaning at all is an open question. See
Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 35859 (1977). If the term "unique" lacks a helpful meaning, then there must be
other reasons why some contracts are enforced through specific relief. This
is the inquiry of this article.

4 H.R. REP. No. 109-648, pt. 1, at 3 (2006) ("[In] the event of insolvency..

• certain types of financial contracts are processed on a net basis to reduce
the risk-especially the systemic risk associated with activities in
derivatives markets.").
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favorable treatment in the form of entitlement to specific relief
because each type of contract represents the dominant form of wealth
in its respective era, and the law surrounding these contracts
developed as a result of, and to protect, the favored status of those
who enter into such contracts.5 This contention suggests that the
stated justifications for special treatment are, to a large degree,
pretextual, and that a more encompassing analysis is needed to
understand why these two types of contracts have been favored with
special treatment. 6 It causes discomfort in polite society to discuss
5 Black's Law Dictionary enumerates four (inconsistent) definitions of

status:
1. A person's legal condition, whether personal or
proprietary; the sum total of a person's legal rights, duties,
liabilities, and other legal relations, or any particular
group of them separately considered <the status of a
landowner>. 2. A person's legal condition regarding
personal rights but excluding proprietary relations <the
status of a father> <the status of a wife>. 3. A person's
capacities and incapacities, as opposed to other elements
of personal status <the status of minors>. 4. A person's
legal condition insofar as it is imposed by the law without
the person's consent, as opposed to a condition that the
person has acquired by agreement <the status of a slave>.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1447 (8th ed. 2004). The meaning of "status"

and how this article uses the word will be discussed more fully below.
6 Professor Laycock exposed the incoherency underlying the stated reasons
for choosing between legal and equitable relief:
These real reasons for denying equitable
remedies are not derived from the adequacy of the legal
remedy or from any general preference for damages.
Some of the reasons are based on the cost of the equitable
remedy in particular circumstances; others apply equally
to legal remedies in similar cases. Sometimes there are
good reasons to deny legal relief and grant equitable relief
instead. But there is no general presumption against
equitable remedies.
I conclude that the irreparable injury rule is dead.
It does not describe what the cases do, and it cannot
account for the results. Injunctions are routine, and
damages are never adequate unless the court wants them
to be. Courts can freely turn to the precedents granting
injunctions or the precedents denying injunctions,
depending on whether they want to hold the legal remedy
adequate or inadequate. Whether they want to hold the

REVIEW OF BANKING

&

FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. 29

issues like status and wealth, but any discussion of contractual
remedies for these types of contracts is incomplete without, at least,
recognizing the possibility that reasons relating to status are an
inherent element of specific relief.
In order to develop this analysis, Part II begins by examining
the doctrinal differences between specific and substitutionary relief.
In addition to the basic discussion concerning the showing necessary
to obtain specific relief, Part II introduces the key concept that the
availability of specific relief is dependent on the existence of a
market by which the value of the contract loss may be determined.
Part III discusses the reasons underlying the application of specific
performance to land contracts, as developed in early English law.
Part IV amplifies the subject of land contracts, and explains the
relationship between the structure of feudal society in England and
the development of specific performance for land contracts. In doing
so, it introduces the crucial importance of status, and the role of land
in determining social, political and legal status in feudal England. An
understanding of the relationship between land and status is
necessary to understand why specific relief was deemed necessary
for breaches of contracts for land.
Part V brings the discussion forward to the contemporary
economy. It discusses the diminished role of land in the modern
economy and society as well as the financial sector's replacement of
land as the pre-eminent sector of the economy. Part VI examines the
role and importance of derivatives within the financial sector and
their role in causing the current economic collapse. Part VII focuses
on the special treatment of financial derivative contracts under the
Bankruptcy Code. In effect, the Code provides that non-debtor
parties to derivatives contracts are entitled to performance of their
contracts notwithstanding general bankruptcy principles to the
contrary, while just about all other non-debtor parties are prohibited
from obtaining performance of their contracts absent court approval.
Why are derivatives favored with such special treatment? Congress
stated such treatment is necessary to prevent "systemic risk," but is
that what is really at stake? This paper attempts to address such
questions. Part VIII highlights the parallels between specific
legal remedy adequate depends on whether they have
some other reason to deny the equitable remedy, and it is
these other reasons that drive the decision.
Douglas Laycock, The Death of the IrreparableInjury Rule, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 687, 692 (1990).
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performance of land contracts in feudal England and the treatment of
financial derivatives under the Bankruptcy Code. This paper asserts
that status is the common element in the favored treatment of both

types of contracts. Just as land contracts in pre-industrial England
determined and embodied status and wealth, derivatives contracts

play a comparable (though not entirely similar or forceful) role
today. This common feature, as much as anything else, explains why
both types of contracts are protected by specific relief. Part IX
concludes the article.

ii.

The Distinction Between Specific and Substitutionary
Relief

A standard formulation of the remedy for breach of contract
is that the remedy is designed to put the plaintiff in the position she

would have been in had the contract been performed. However, the
typical contract remedy does not provide this result. If an employer
breaches an employment contract, the remedy that would put the
employee in the same position she would have been in is a remedy
that would require the employer to perform the contract by providing
employment on the agreed terms. Instead of this remedy, however,
all the employee can hope to recover is money damages. Simply put,
money damages are not the same as contractual performance. As
Professor Murphy explains:
A fundamental distinction in the law of remedies is
the difference between specific and substitutionary
relief. Specific relief gives the plaintiff the original
thing to which the plaintiff is or was entitled;
substitutionary relief gives the plaintiff something
other than its original entitlement. The most common
form of substitutionary relief is money.8
7 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §

12.1, at 730 (4th ed. 2004)

[hereinafter FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS].
8 Colleen P. Murphy, Money as a "Specific" Remedy, 58 ALA. L. REV. 119,
119-20 (2006). Professor Farnsworth explains this difference as follows:
The judicial remedies available for breach of contract can
be characterized as "specific" or "substitutional." Relief is
said to be specific when it is intended to give the injured
party the very performance that was promised, as when
the court orders a defaulting seller of goods to deliver
them to the buyer. Relief is said to be substitutional when
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Thus, when it comes to contract damages, the law generally does not
provide relief by ordering performance of the contract. What the law
generally provides is something other than performance-namely,
damages. 9 The law also does not generally prohibit breaches of
contract (through frequently granting injunctions prohibiting breach).
Parties are free to breach, but they also become liable for damages. 10
This is another key distinction between substitutionary and specific
remedies: The substitutionary remedy is awarded after the loss has
occurred, while the specific remedy may sometimes be imposed to
prevent the loss from occurring in the first place."
In order to provide a substitutionary remedy, the substitute
must be equivalent in value to the loss. This necessarily requires
some valuation mechanism. To illustrate, suppose a seller breaches a
contract to sell a widget. In the ordinary case, the buyer's remedy
will be damages (in this case, the value of the widget minus the price
to have been paid). How does the law value the widget? It simply
looks to the market for widgets. Thus, the availability of damages as
a remedy requires the existence of a market or market-like
mechanism to ensure that the substitute remedy is of equivalent value
to the failure to perform. 2 Indeed, the availability of a damages
it is intended to give the promisee something in
substitution for the promised performance, as when the
court awards a buyer of goods money damages instead of
the goods.
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 7, § 12.2, at 734-35.
9 In the law of contracts, courts have a choice of remedy between specific
and substitutionary relief. In torts, however, there is usually no such choice.
The only remedy available in most tort instances is substitutionary. The
extreme example is a wrongful death, for which the only remedy is a
substitute for the loss.
10 Justice Holmes stated it this way: "The duty to keep a contract at common
law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,
and nothing else." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
" Laycock, supra note 6, at 696.
12 This need for a market mechanism was implicitly recognized in
this
statement:
The law, concerning itself more and more with
merchandise bought or sold for money, with things having
a definite and calculable exchange value, came to
conceive that the money compensation, which was an
entirely adequate remedy in the common case, and in
many cases the only possible one when once the wrong
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remedy necessarily assumes the existence of a market economy and
market mechanisms in the first place, "since in a market economy
money ought to enable an aggrieved promisee to arrange a substitute

transaction." 13 Without a market, there is no reliable basis upon
which to determine damages. In such a situation, specific relief is the
only remedy available.

Scholarly commentators have pondered several reasons why
damages are the favored remedy over specific performance for a
breach of contract claim. To an extent, the favoring of damages over
specific performance is puzzling. After all, specific performance is
the most accurate means to remedy a breach of contract because it
gives the non-breaching party the precise performance that he
contracted for.' 4 In fact, specific performance was the generally

available

remedy

for

breach

of contract

in

England

until

approximately 1260, at which time damages became the favored

remedy. '
complained of had been committed, was the only remedy
available for their use ....
CHARLES ANDREWS HUSTON, THE ENFORCEMENT OF DECREES IN EQUITY

74(1915).

13E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM.
L. REV. 1145, 1154 (1970).
14Alan Schwartz, The Casefor Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271,
274 (1979). So why is specific performance not routinely available?
Professor Schwartz cites three not entirely satisfactory (by his own
description) reasons:
First, the law's commitment to the compensation goal
may be less than complete; restricting specific
performance may reflect an inarticulate reluctance to
pursue the compensation goal fully. Second, damages may
generally be fully compensatory. In that event, expanding
the availability of specific performance would create
opportunities for promisees to exploit promisors by
threatening to compel, or actually compelling, performance, without furthering the compensation goal. The third
explanation is that concerns of efficiency or liberty may
justify restricting specific performance, despite its greater
accuracy; specific performance might generate higher
transaction costs than the damage remedy, or interfere
more with the liberty interests of promisors.
Id. at 274.
15 Id. at 274 n.15. Specific performance is now "strictly an ancillary and
supplementary remedy, and is confined to those classes of agreements for
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One common explanation for the limited availability of
specific performance is that courts are reluctant to supervise the
performance of contracts. 16 Thus, judicial resources are conserved,
and judges are spared from duties beyond their expertise (such as
supervising a construction project). 17 It is incorrect to conclude,
however, that specific performance always requires more judicial
involvement than an award of damages. Specific performance can
also be viewed as a means to limit judicial involvement. By ordering
performance, a court avoids the task of valuing the loss. There is no
need to resolve potentially thorny issues such as whether or not
consequential damages are recoverable. The significance of this
point, for purposes of this article, is that when the law favors or
requires specific relief for a certain type of contract, it is (in some
cases) preventing the need for a judicial determination of the value or
amount of the loss. To put it more broadly, specific relief avoids or
prevents third party (i.e., judicial) interference with the operation of
the contract by preventing the third party from substituting
something other than performance.
There are numerous reasons why specific performance is a
superior remedy to damages. Nevertheless, the law favors damages
over specific performance, and courts will only grant specific
performance when damages are inadequate compensation for the
plaintiff. 8 Again, this is a standard formulation of contract remedies,
but it raises the question: inadequate compensation of what? The
quick response is that the plaintiff must show damages are
inadequate compensation for the loss, but what exactly is the loss? Is
it something that can be valued in the market? A related question is
why are some losses deemed to be adequately compensable by
whose breach the mere payment of pecuniary damages is acknowledged to
be either impracticable or inadequate." JOHN NORTON POMEROY & JOHN C.
MANN, A TREATISE ON THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS § 4, at
5 (3d ed. 1986).
16 FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 7, § 12.4, at 742.
17See POMEROY & MANN, supra note 15, § 23, at 61.
18

Schwartz, supra note 14, at 272. Saying that damages are inadequate

compensation is another way of saying that there is no market to determine
the adequate amount of damages. In such a situation, the risk is too great
that damages will not address the totality of the loss. When the subject of
the contract is deemed "unique," "the risk is greater that the promisee's
money damage remedy will be under-compensatory" because "there is no
developed market generating information about the value of the subject
matter of their contract." Kronman, supra note 3, at 366.
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money, while others are not? Such questions may seem simple and
basic. However, the analysis requires consideration of factors that
may not even be expressed or acknowledged by policymakers when
choosing between the two forms of remedy.' 9
III.

Specific Performance and Land

In the development of early English law, real property was
accorded a greater importance and value than personal property.20
Professor Farnsworth observed:
Land was viewed by English courts with particular
esteem and was therefore singled out for special
treatment. Each parcel, however ordinary, was considered "unique," and its value was regarded as to
some extent speculative. From this it followed that,
if a vendor broke a promise to convey an interest in
land, money would not enable the injured purchaser
to buy a substitute, and specific performance would
generally be granted. 21
Even after the English courts came to regard money damages as the
norm and specific relief as a deviation from this norm, specific
performance remained the favored remedy for land contracts. 22 For
centuries now, courts have regarded money damages as an
inadequate remedy for a breached contract for the sale of land. Thus,
equitable jurisdiction is firmly established where land is the subject
'9 In this vein, one commentator observed:

Unfortunately, the legal conclusion that the legal remedy
is inadequate masks the intellectual process of identifying
and evaluating interests. Moreover, though the inadequacy
prerequisite has proved flexible enough to adopt [sic] to
changed conditions, it grants excessive discretion and is
too imprecise to ensure predictability. To expose that
intellectual process and to constrain discretion with a rude
set of standards are the modest goals of the present effort.
Doug Rendelman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisitefor an
Injunction, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 346, 358 (1980).
20 POMEROY & MANN, supra note 15, § 9, at 22-23 n.(e).
21 FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 7, § 12.6, at 749.

22 Id. § 12.4, at 741 ("Only for land, which English courts regarded with
particular esteem, was a general exception made, on the ground that each
parcel of land was 'unique' so money damages were inadequate.").
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matter of a breached contract, and specific performance is the
favored remedy 3
One explanation for why specific performance remained the
favored remedy is that there was no adequate market mechanism in
pre-industrial England to value the loss caused by a breach of a land
contract:
[There are many cases where] the ability of money
to purchase an exact equivalent does not exist. One
landed estate, though of precisely the same market
value as another, may be entirely different in every
other circumstance that makes it an object of desire.
The vendee in a land contract may recover back the
purchase money which he has paid, and with the
damages which he thus receives he may purchase
another estate of equal market value, but then there
may be numerous features and incidents connected
with the former tract which induced him to purchase,
which made it to him peculiarly desirable, but which
were not taken into account in the estimate of his
damages, and which cannot be found in any other
land which he may buy with the money. It is evident
that in this and similar cases there would be a failure
of justice unless some other jurisdiction supplemented that of the common law, by compelling the
defaulting party to do that which in conscience he is
bound to do, namely, actually and specifically to
24
perform his agreement.
As discussed further in Section IV, a contract for land in preindustrial England embodied numerous rights, obligations, and
benefits for which there was no market. This is the essence of why
money was an inadequate remedy. Any assertion that land was
viewed as unique (and thus in need of specific performance) because
of a parcel's unique topographical and geographical features is
incomplete and simplistic. It evokes a misty view of a distant era
23 POMEROY

&

MANN,

supra note 15, §10, at 23. Equity adopted this

principle, "not because [the land] was fertile or rich in minerals ... but
because it was land a favorite and favored subject in England, and every
country of Anglo Saxon origin." Kitchen v. Herring, 42 N.C. 190, 190
(1851).
24 POMEROY & MANN, supra note 15, § 9, at 21-22.
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when dukes required specific performance so that they could enjoy a
particular view. Thus, first year law students are led to believe in
their Contracts and Property classes that an entire legal doctrine was
developed to protect the aesthetic and sentimental sensibilities of the
noble classes. While this view may have its quaint charm, land was
accorded special treatment and deference, not because of the land
itself, but because of the incalculable rights and benefits tied to
ownership of the land-the status conferred by land.25
The Role of Land in Feudal England as an Explanation
for the Development of Specific Performance of Land
Contracts

IV.

So, what explains the importance and reverence for land in
the development of the law in England (and later, as received by
American jurisprudence)? The answer is found by tracing the law's
development to feudal England. In feudal England, land was
paramount because it was the basis of the social and political order in
the feudal hierarchy.
The feudal system existed throughout Europe and developed
in England after the conquest by William the Conqueror in 1066.26
The basis and origin of the feudal system arose out of military
conquest. 27 A conquering general would reward his senior officers by
allotting to them large parcels of the conquered land, and the senior
officers would, after retaining a large parcel for themselves, allot
smaller parcels to their inferior officers. 28 These allotments were
called "feuds, fiefs, or fees., 2 9 The allotment of conquered land also
imposed a reciprocal system of duty and service on the recipients of
land, the feudatories. Every feudatory was under the command of and
bound to defend his grantor. 30 The feudal system ensured that the
monarch had a ready military force of feudatories prepared to defend
him, each other, and the territory as a whole.31 In addition to military
25

Nancy Perkins Spyke, What's Land Got to Do with It?: Rhetoric and

Indeterminacy in Land's FavoredLegal Status, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 387, 391

(2004).
26 See

2 WILLIAM

27

1d at 45.
28 Id.
29 id.

3

I1d. at 46.
lId.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 48

(1766).
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duties, the feudatories also acquired with the land a set of duties to
provide civic services. Each had the duty to assist the monarch in the
administration of justice within his territory. Such duties included the
duty to resolve disputes involving tenants of the land and the duty to
sit as a jury member in the trial of a peer.32 The rewards of conquest,
and the corresponding duties, were all tied to the allotted land. Thus,
land defined the role and status of these elite members of their
society. Their relationship to one another and the monarch depended
on their landholding.
In addition to defining status in medieval England, ownership of land defined wealth. The feudatory enjoyed the fruits of the
land and the labor of the landless peasants who worked the land. Not
surprisingly, land was the predominant form of economic wealth in
pre-industrial England.34 Given the nature and role of land during the
development of law in pre-industrial England, the law's special view
of land is not surprising:
Land, partly because of its scarcity, perhaps, but
generally because of its power to determine the
32

Id. at 54.

33Spyke, supra note 25, at 394; Laycock, supra note 6, at 703.
34 David Cohen, The Relationship of ContractualRemedies to Political and
Social Status: A Preliminary Inquiry, 32 U. TORONTO L.J. 31, 37 (1982);
Spyke, supra note 25, at 420. Indeed, forms of wealth other than land
appear to have discouraged in such times:
Entailment made the income of the nobility
dependent on agriculture: Because they were unable to
sell their land and invest the funds in other assets, the
nobility could generate wealth only from rent. And except
for the few whose lands were located at the site of a
mineral deposit or a growing urban area, rent could be
received only from farmers who used the land for
agricultural purposes. Consequently, although the nobility
were assured of a steady source of income, they were
discouraged from entrepreneurial wealth-seeking in favor
of playing their family's role as the symbol of law and
order.
Fred Bosselman, Four Land Ethics: Order, Reform, Responsibility,
Opportunity, 24 ENVTL. L. 1439, 1452 (1994). As expected, social status
was also tied to land and its attendant wealth. Jason S. Kirwan, Appraisinga
Presumption: A Modern Look at the Doctrine of Specific Performance in
Real Estate Contracts, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 697, 703 (2005). When the
industrial class emerged, land provided the distinction between the nobility
and the "nouveaux riches" merchants. Cohen, supra, at 53.
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financial, social and political status of every British
subject, was naturally a highly favored subject in the
courts of Britain. The courts of that country it seems,
were fully justified in assuming, under the existing
circumstances, that all land did have a special and
particular value. Land was power and influence and
those were things much desired.35
The history and role of land in medieval England makes it
plain why contracts for land were enforceable by specific performance. Money was simply not a substitute for land. How would a court
determine the amount of loss represented by the loss of status that
only comes with the land? What is the amount of loss represented by
the loss of one's place in society, of one's place among other
landholders? What is the amount of loss represented by the loss of
the ability to expropriate the labor value of tenants? These are the
considerations that led to the development of specific performance of
land contracts. Moreover, in a society based on status, there was no
market to determine the value of that status (as discussed below,
status is the antithesis of the market). Thus, any suggestion that
specific performance developed solely because land qua land is
difficult to value is incorrect. A breached contract for land was
difficult to value, but the difficulty was due to the impracticability of
putting a value on the status conferred by land. Thus, contrary to
popular misconception, specific performance did not develop to
soothe the aesthetic sensibilities of an aristocrat who wanted a
particular view of the sunset.
V.

The Role of Finance in Determining Status and Wealth in
Contemporary America

While land remains an important source of wealth, it obviously is not the only, or predominant, source of wealth in contemporary America. The role of land as the predominant determinant of
wealth was undoubtedly weakened by the Industrial Revolution of
the nineteenth century. By the early twentieth century, observers
were commenting on the weakening of land's link to wealth:
"To the common law title to real estate was as sacred
as was a prerogative of the King. Under modern
3 Robert Bird & William E. Fanning, Specific Performance of Contracts to
Convey Real Estate, 23 IKY. L.J. 380, 380-81 (1934).
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conditions, title to real estate is but a property right,
little, if any, superior in the eyes of the law to any
other property right." And, in this country where
money "does the talking" rather than land, why
shouldn't money satisfy in all cases where there is
no special or peculiar 36
value attached to the land by
the party complaining?
More pointedly, these commentators added: "We cannot in general
see the uniqueness of land in this country. It is not the basis of our
social, political, or governmental system, nor does it, just because it
is land, bring any power to the owner., 37 Thus, the era when land
was the determinant of wealth and status was already over by the
1930's (and undoubtedly earlier). Instead, "[o]ther contracts which
have nothing at all to do with real property may have replaced, or at
least joined, land contracts as the focal point of social expectations
and obligations., 38 This last statement (as read today) is mostly, but
not entirely, correct. It is only incorrect today in stating that other
contracts "may have" replaced land contracts as a socially dominant
force. Other contracts have, in fact, taken the pre-eminent position.
So what has replaced land? In one word-finance. Back in
1950, when the American economy had a more vibrant manufacturing base, manufacturing's share of the gross domestic product was
29.3% compared to 10.9% for financial services. 39 By 2005,
manufacturing's share had dropped to 12%, and financial services
had grown to 20.4% .4o In this decade, profits from the financial
services sector reached 41% of all corporate profits in America.41
3

6Id. at 384 (quoting Duckworth v. Michael, 19 Pac. (2d) 914 (1933)).
17 Id. at 383-84.
38 Cohen, supra note 34, at 36.
39 KEVIN PHILLIPS,

BAD MONEY:

RECKLESS FINANCE, FAILED POLITICS,

AND THE GLOBAL CRISIS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM
40 id.
41

31 (2008).

Professor Johnson, the former chief economist at the International

Monetary Fund and a professor at the Sloan School of Management at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, wrote:
From 1973 to 1985, the financial sector never earned
more than 16 percent of domestic corporate profits. In
1986, that figure reached 19 percent. In the 1990s, it
oscillated between 21 percent and 30 percent, higher than
it had ever been in the postwar period. This decade, it
reached 41 percent.
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"Not long ago, the sum of all financial assets-stocks, bonds, loans,
mortgages, and the like, which are claims on real things-were about
equal to global GDP. Now they are approaching four times global
GDP. 42 Given these types of numbers, it is not surprising that
informed observers would make comments such as: "Over the past
generation-ever since the banking deregulation of the Reagan
years-the U.S. economy has been 'financialized.' The business of
moving money around, of slicing, dicing and repackaging financial
claims, has soared in importance compared with the actual
production of useful stuff., 43 To the extent anyone wonders why the
financial industry deserves such scrutiny, is there any question that it
created and caused the global economic collapse? The important
inquiry now is to determine how it was allowed to grow to the point
where it could cause this type of damage.
The growth of the financial industry is significant, but the
breathtaking rise in its significance is only understood when
examining what this growth has meant for individual wealth. From
1948 to 1982, the average compensation for financial center workers
was about the same as the average for all domestic private industries.44 By 2007, financial sector compensation grew dramatically to
181 percent of other private sector compensation.4 5 Any reference to
average compensation is misleading, however, because of the
explosive growth in compensation at the top slice of the hierarchical
pyramid:
One of the most striking developments over the past
quarter-century is the dramatic shift of taxable
incomes toward the wealthiest people. Between 1980
and 2005, the top tenth of the population's share of
all taxable income went from 34 percent to 46
percent, an increase of about a third. The changing
distribution within the top 10 percent, however, is
what's truly remarkable. The unlucky folks in the
90th to the 95th percentiles actually lost a little
Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, ATLANTIC, May 2009, http://www.
theatlantic.com/doc/200905/imf-advice.
42 CHARLES

R.

MORRIS, THE TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN: EASY MONEY,

HIGH ROLLERS, AND THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH xii

41Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The Joy ofSachs, N.Y.
A23.
44 Johnson, supra note 41.
45 [d.

(2008).

TIMES,

July 17, 2009, at
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ground, while those in the 95th to 99th gained a
little. Overall, however, income shares in the 90th to
99th percentile population were basically flat (24
percent in 1980 and 26 percent in 2005).
Almost all the top one-tenth's share gains, in
other words, went to the top 1 percent, or the top
"centile," who doubled their share of national cash
income from 9 percent to 19 percent. Even within
the top centile, however, the distribution of gains
was radically skewed. Nearly 60 percent of it went to
the top tenth of 1 percent of the population, and
more than a fourth of it to the top one-hundredth of 1
percent of the population. Overall, the top tenth of 1
percent more than tripled their share of cash income
to about 9 percent, while the top one-hundredth of 1
percent, or fewer than 15,000 taxpayers, quadrupled
their share to 3.6 percent of all taxable income.
Among those 15,000, the average tax return reported
$26 million of income in 2005, while the take for the
entire group was $384 billion. 46
-

The numbers are more astounding when considered in terms of individual compensation. In 2007, one hedge fund manager made $3.7
billion by shorting subprime mortgage securities and collateralized
debt obligations.4 7 In 2007, the average annual compensation for the
top twenty-five highest paid hedge fund managers was $892
million. 48 The head of the AIG unit that was involved in credit
default swaps was paid approximately $280 million in this decade.49
Such figures led one prominent political commentator to state: "The
flight of the economy from tangibles to money manipulation is

supra note 42, at 139-40.
Heidi N. Moore, How the 10 Richest Hedge Fund Managers Got That
Way, DEAL JOURNAL, Apr. 16, 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2008/04/
16/how-filthy-rich-hedge-fund-managers-got-that-way/?mod-WSJBlog.
48 Rex Nutting, Hedge-Fund Managers Have Biggest Payday in History,
46 MORRIS,

47

MARKETWATCH,

Apr. 16, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/hedge-

fund-managers-tally-up-biggest-payday-alpha-magazine.
41 Peter Koeing, AIG Trail Leads to London 'Casino', DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Oct. 18, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/fmancetopics/financial
crisis/3225213/AIG-trail-leads-to-London-casino.html.
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enriching a broad cross section of the upper-echelon institutions and
practitioners of U.S. finance .... ,,5o
Obviously, this level of compensation was attained by only
an infinitesimal number of the world's six or seven billion people.
However, the present inquiry is whether the law enabled such
paydays, and how did it happen? This inquiry is also the reason why
this paper draws parallels to another era when a group of an
infinitesimal few enjoyed vast wealth beyond the grasp of almost
everyone else-the feudal era when lords presided over their
landholdings, living off of the natural resources and the labor of their
tenants. At first, the comparison may seem crude and superficial. In
one era, there lived a small number of people whose wealth was
unimaginable and grossly disproportionate to that of everyone else,
and they were called the landed nobility. In another era, there lived a
small number of people whose wealth was equally unimaginable and
grossly disproportionate to everyone else, and they were called
investment bankers, derivatives traders, hedge fund managers and the
like. But the comparison holds lessons in how law develops and what
law protects. In both eras, the law developed mechanisms to protect
and preserve these elites and did so (in one small measure) by
favoring specific relief in the enforcement of their contracts. The
conclusion to be drawn, then, is that the law resorts to specific relief
in some instances in order to protect and preserve elite interests. But
what exactly is being protected or preserved? This article proposes
the possibility that the law provides specific relief to protect status
(including the status that is the source of the ability to realize the
wealth). 5'
The next question would then be: How are the elite interests
able to develop and apply the doctrine to benefit their status and
wealth? To some extent, it is like the chicken or egg question: Which
came first, status or wealth? The answer may be unknowable, but
there is no question that a virtuous circle (for its beneficiaries) exists
where wealth is used to influence law in order to protect status, and
status is used to protect wealth. One prominent economist made the
following observation regarding the current situation:

50 PHILLIPS, supra note

39, at 63.

51 In the larger picture, specific relief plays, of course, a small role in the
protection and preservation of status, and this article does not suggest any
role larger than it actually is. The modest purpose is to bring attention to an
often overlooked doctrine and its involvement in policy choices.
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[E]lite business interests-financiers, in the case of
the U.S.-played a central role in creating the crisis,
making ever-larger gambles, with the implicit backing
of the government, until the inevitable collapse. More
alarming, they are now using their influence to prevent precisely the sorts of reforms that are needed,
and fast, to pull the economy out of its nosedive. The
government seems helpless, or unwilling, to act
against them ....

The great wealth that the financial

sector created and concentrated gave bankers enormous political weight-a weight not seen
in the U.S.
52
since the era of J.P. Morgan (the man).
This political clout is evident in the way derivatives have been
singled out for special treatment.
VI.

The Role of Financial Derivatives in the Modern Economy

As recently as the 1980's, the total amount of global
financial assets was roughly equal to the total amount of the world's
gross domestic product.53 By the end of 2005, global financial assets
were about 3.7 times larger than global GDP.54 The growth in
derivatives fueled a large part of this expansion 5 Derivatives
provide their holders with the ability to profit from assets that they
do not actually own:
Derivatives are financial instruments or contracts
with values that are linked to, or derived from, the
performance of underlying financial instruments,
interest rates, currency exchange rates, or indexes. In
a simplified sense, a derivative links its holder to the
risks and rewards of owning an underlying financial
instrument without actually owning the financial
instrument 6

52

Johnson, supra note 41.
MORRIS, supra note 42, at 134.

5,
54 id.
55 See id. at

134-35.
Allan C. Pulwalski, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Derivatives Risk in
Commercial Banking, Mar. 26, 2003, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
analytical/fyi/2003/032603fyi.html.
56
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Derivatives today are within the domain of the most sophisticated
financial institutions, and are developed by mathematicians with
PhD's. 51 Indeed, the mechanics of many derivatives are beyond the
comprehension of even those with formal, advanced training and a
sophisticated financial background. 58 However, the origins of
derivatives are more humble.
Derivatives originally developed to serve basic and simple
market needs. For example, a forward contract is a form of a
derivative, and its origins are plain and understandable. A farmer
who plants crops in the spring does not know what the market price
of the crop will be in the fall. However, he can lock in a guaranteed
price when he plants his crops in the spring by selling a crop forward
contract to a buyer who agrees to pay the guaranteed price in the fall.
By virtue of this contract, the farmer is protected against a drop in the
market price between the fall and spring, and the buyer is protected
against a rise in the price during that same period. Thus, derivatives,
as originally developed, can provide a useful market function.59

" Nelson D. Schwartz & Julie Creswell, What Createdthis Monster?, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, § BU,at 1.

58 Even someone like Alan Blinder, the former vice-chairman of the Board

of Governors of the Federal Reserve and current Gordon S. Rentschler
Memorial Professor of Economics at Princeton University, reportedly
admitted to only "a modest understanding of derivatives" and an inability to
place a value on any particular derivative. Id.
59 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation describes the benefits of
derivatives in this way:
Derivatives are important to the financial markets and the
world economy because they provide a means for
companies to separate and trade various kinds of risks.
The ability of participants in the financial markets to
adjust specific risk exposures enhances the efficiency of
capital flows by allowing companies to conduct business
activities without amassing certain risks that would
otherwise attend that business. For instance, mortgage
lenders that are comfortable with the credit risk of
mortgage lending may be less comfortable with the
amount of exposure to interest rate movements that
accompany a large mortgage portfolio. A mortgage
company can use derivatives to lessen their exposure to
the effect that interest rate movements might have on the
value of their business and continue to make mortgage
loans.
Mortgage
borrowers
benefit
from
these

REVIEW OF BANKING

&

Vol. 29

FINANCIAL LAW

The size of the derivatives market is staggering. In 2008, the
size of the worldwide derivatives market exceeded $530 trillion. 60 By
contrast, the world's gross domestic product in 2008 was $62
trillion. 61 The market is also concentrated in that it is dominated by a
few, elite international banks and securities firms. In 2002, the ten
largest derivatives dealers were counterparties to most of the
derivatives transactions that took place, and just seven U.S. banks
held over 95% of the U.S. banking system's notional derivatives
exposure. 62 In the first quarter of 2009, just five banks represented
96% of the total industry notional amount of derivatives activity in
the U.S. banking system.63 The derivatives activities also returned to
profitability for American commercial banks after the collapse in
2008. The banks generated $9.8 billion from derivatives in the first
quarter of 2009, compared to a loss of $9.2 billion in the fourth
quarter of 2008.64
The market for derivatives has moved far beyond its simple
roots. Its scale now dwarfs the "real economy" and it has turned into
something that threatens the global economy.65 Paul Krugman, the
2008 Nobel Prize recipient for his work in economics, describes the
roots of the economic crisis:
arrangements because mortgages are cheaper when
lenders have choices about the risks that they retain.
Pulwalski, supra note 56.
60 Sarah N. Lynch, Harkin Seeks to Force All Derivatives onto Exchanges,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122721812
727545583.html.
61 id.
62

Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the

Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22
(2005).

YALE

J.

ON REG.

91, 98

63 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ADM'R OF NAT'L

BANKS, OCC'S QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES
ACTIVITIES FIRST QUARTER 2009 1 (2009), available at http://www.

occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2009-72a.pdf.
64 id.
65 Much of this growth is due to the rise of the "shadow banking system." A
paper issued through the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis defines the
"shadow banking system" as the system of credit instruments "that exist
outside of the traditional commercial banking system, especially those
related to consumer credit." Julie Stackhouse & Bill Emmons, Fed. Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, The Credit Crunch Reflects Collapse of a "Shadow
Banking System," CENTRAL BANKER, Spring 2009, available at
http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/cb/2009/a/pages/in-depth.cfm.
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To understand the problem, you need to know that
the old world of banking, in which institutions
housed in big marble buildings accepted deposits
and lent the money out to long-term clients, has
largely vanished, replaced by what is widely called
the "shadow banking system." Depository banks, the
guys in the marble buildings, now play only a minor
role in channeling funds from savers to borrowers;
most of the business of finance is carried out through
complex deals arranged by "nondepository" institutions, institutions like the late lamented Bear
Stearns-and Lehman.6 6
The shadow banking system's use of derivatives lies at the heart of
the crisis. The shadow banking system has been described as a "chain
letter," and a "pyramid scheme of leverage." 6 Of all the derivatives
in play in this system, experts have pointed to credit default swaps
("CDS") 68 as the most egregious offenders in creating risk and
66 Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., FinancialRussian Roulette, N.Y.

TIMES,

Sept.

15, 2008, at A25.
For example, in the old [pre-shadow banking] system,
savers had federally insured deposits in tightly regulated
savings banks, and banks used that money to make home
loans. Over time, however, this was partly replaced by a
[shadow banking] system in which savers put their money
in funds that bought asset-backed commercial paper from
special investment vehicles that bought collateralized debt
obligations created from securitized mortgages - with
nary a regulator in sight.
Paul K-rugman, Op-Ed., PartyingLike It's 1929, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/21 /opinion/21 krugman.html.
67 Caroline Salas, Credit Derivatives May Lose $250 Billion, Gross Says,
BLOOMBERG, Jan. 8, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid20601087&sid-aObPUzH R3dJs&refer-home.
68 In simple terms, a "credit default swap is a private contract in which
private parties bet on a debt issuer's bankruptcy, default, or restructuring."
Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit
Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1021 (2007). It is a contract between
two parties in which one party buys, and the other party sells, protection
against a specified financial event (typically an event involving a default on
an obligation issued by a third party). The Second Circuit has described a
CDS as "a contract which transfers credit risk from a protection buyer to a
credit protection seller." See Aon Fin. Prods., Inc. v. Soci6t6 Gn6rale, 476
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F.3d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v.
Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 171-72 (2d Cir. 2004)).
A (simplified) credit default swap may look like this: Big State
Pension Fund ("BSPF") buys $10,000,000 of bonds issued by Steady
Reliable Corp. ("SRC"). BSPF wants to protect itself against the unlikely
(but not impossible) event of SRC going out of business and the inability of
SRC to meet its obligations under its bonds. Global International Bank
("GIB") is in the business of selling credit protection. BSPF and GIB enter
into a credit default swap under which BSPF makes periodic payments to
GIB in return for GIB's commitment that it will pay BSPF $10,000,000 if
SRC files a bankruptcy petition. If SRC does not trigger a "credit event" as
defined in the CDS, then GIB keeps the money from BSPF. If SRC goes
under, GIB pays out on the CDS.
In the language of the CDS market, BSPF is the "protection buyer"
and GIB is the "protection seller." The protection buyer pays for protection
with "reference" to a specific credit obligation (in this case, the bonds
issued by Steady Reliable Corp.). The credit obligation is referred to as the
"reference obligation," and the issuer of that obligation (in this case, SRC)
is referred to as the "reference entity." The amount of protection purchased
by the protection buyer is called the "notional amount," which in this
example would be $10,000,000.
This plain vanilla type of CDS serves a useful market function. But
Wall Street took this basic CDS and turned it into something that barely
resembles the basic structure. This is what Professor Partnoy concluded
with regard to such credit default swaps:
Wall Street saw they could use credit default swaps to
create an infinite amount of crap. They quickly engineered
new repackaging transactions, using credit default swaps
to clone risky subprime-mortgaged-backed investments
that, when pooled, generated more sky-high ratings. These
new deals were known as "synthetic" CDOs, because they
had been created artificially, through derivatives side bets.
Instead of basing payoffs on subprime mortgage loans that
actually existed in the real world, the banks created an
Alice in Wonderland world and based payoffs on the
multiple virtual realities that were down the rabbit hole.
PARTNOY, supra note 1, at 264. Professor Partnoy and Skeel provide a
description of a collateralized debt obligation ("CDO"):
[A] collateralized debt obligation (CDO) is a pool of debt
contracts housed within a special purpose entity (SPE)
whose capital structure is sliced and resold based on
differences in credit quality. In a "cash flow" CDO, the
SPE purchases a portfolio of outstanding debt issued by a
range of companies, and finances its purchase by issuing
its own financial instruments, including primarily debt but
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imbalances.6 9 So what harm did derivatives do? As Professor Partnoy
explains:
Without derivatives, the total losses from the spike
in subprime mortgage defaults would have been
relatively small and easily contained. . . .Instead,
derivatives multiplied the losses from subprime
mortgage loans, through side bets based on credit
default swaps. Still more credit default swaps, based
on defaults by banks and insurance companies themselves, magnified losses on the subprime side bets.
As investors learned about all of this side betting,
they began to lose confidence in the system.70
The crisis reached a peak in September 2008. One market observer
described it this way:
Around the world, stock markets collapsed, wiping
$600 billion off global equity prices in just thirty-six
also equity. In a "synthetic" CDO, the SPE does not
purchase actual bonds, but instead enters into several
credit default swaps with a third party, to create synthetic
exposure to the outstanding debt issued by a range of
companies. The SPE finances its purchase by issuing
financial instruments to investors, but these instruments
are backed by credit default swaps rather than any actual
bonds.
Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 68, at 1019. This relationship between CDS's
and CDO's is also explained as follows:
With powerful computers and a lot of brainpower, a CDO
manager can create a synthetic CDO, that is, an array of
swaps with a risk structure just like a normal "cash-flow"
CDO that is built from real securities. The manager must
carefully build a reference CDO portfolio, mirroring
thousands of real market instruments, and then model its
performance under stress. When he is satisfied with the
structure, he creates the family of credit default swaps that
will return the same profits and losses as the bonds on an
identical cash-flow CDO.
MORRIS, supra note 42, at 75. In plain English, derivatives were created out
of thin air, existing only as computer entries and contracts (which enjoy
special treatment under federal legislation).
69 Salas, supra note 67. The deliberate failure to regulate credit
default
swaps is discussed later in this article.
70 PARTNOY, supra note 1, at 267-68.
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hours. More devastating still was the pattern
unfolding deep inside the debt markets. As investors
around the world confronted these triple shocks,
many panicked to such an extent that they completely withdrew from the market. Almost overnight,
liquidity dried up in a host of different debt markets.
Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley
suddenly found it impossible to raise funds in the
capital markets. .

.

. The implication was brutal:

across the Western world, the senior managers of a
host of the world's largest banks and brokers quietly
told their central banks that they could collapse
within days ....

The issue was no longer a run on

one bank or hedge funds, as in the summer of 2007,
or a run on "just" the shadow banking world. A run
on the entire system had started.71
With the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that derivatives
did in fact unleash the feared destruction. "Without derivatives,
leveraged bets on subprime mortgage loans could not have spread so
far or so fast. Without derivatives, the complex risks that destroyed
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch, and decimated
dozens of banks and insurance72companies, including AIG, could not
have been hidden from view.",
The economic collapse cannot be understood without
understanding the role of derivatives. It is a universally shared view
that the scale of the collapse was magnified by derivatives. So what
did Congress have to say about derivatives?
VII.

The Treatment of Financial Derivative Contracts under the

Bankruptcy Code
A debtor in bankruptcy enjoys a wide array of powerful
protections against contractual counter-parties. For example, the
automatic stay prohibits non-debtor parties from taking any action to
enforce their contractual rights or claims against the debtor or
property of the debtor's estate. 73 Non-debtor parties are prohibited
238 (2009).
supra note 1, at 248.
7111 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006). An automatic stay works like this:
71 GILLIAN TETT, FOOL'S GOLD
72 PARTNOY,
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from exercising ipsofacto clauses in their contracts with the debtor.74
The debtor also has the right to choose whether to assume or reject
executory contracts.75
To illustrate, a local bank that makes a loan to a small
business secured by its forklifts as collateral is prohibited by the
automatic stay from seizing the collateral once the debtor files a
bankruptcy petition. 76 An insurance company that insures the small
When a firm files a bankruptcy petition, it immediately
enjoys the benefit of the Bankruptcy Code's "automatic
stay," which forbids any creditor from taking steps to
collect debts, seize assets, or otherwise "exercise control
over property" of the debtor firm. The automatic stay is a
core element of any attempt to reorganize under the Code.
By shielding the debtor's assets and preventing a race that
rewards the first creditor to the courthouse, it avoids
dismemberment of a firm with going-concern value and
facilitates a collective proceeding in which the parties
(debtor and creditors) can negotiate the terms under which
the firm will continue as a going concern.
Edwards & Morrison, supra note 62, at 95.
14 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (2006). An ipso facto clause is a clause in a
contract that provides that the contract may be terminated in the event of a
party's insolvency or bankruptcy filing.
15 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006). Automatic stay permits nonperformance of
executory contracts as follows:
Generally, when a debtor firm enters bankruptcy, it is
party to many ongoing ("executory") contracts, in which
the debtor and its counterparties have continuing obligations to each other. Some of these contracts will be
profitable to the debtor (they are "in the money"); others
will not be (they are "out of the money"). The automatic
stay prevents counterparties from taking any step to
terminate these ongoing contracts. Instead the debtor has
an exclusive right to "assume" profitable contracts and
"reject" (i.e., breach) unprofitable ones, the consequence
being that the counterparty to the "rejected" contract will
receive an unsecured claim for damages, which will
usually be paid a few cents on the dollar. In other words,
the Bankruptcy Code generally allows debtors to "cherry
pick" profitable from unprofitable contracts.
Edwards & Morrison, supra note 62, at 95-96.
76 If the bank wants to move against the collateral, it may seek court
approval to do so pursuant to a motion for relief from stay. 11 U.S.C. §
362(d).
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business is prohibited from canceling the insurance policy on the
grounds that the policy contains an ipso facto clause. If the debtor
has a long-term contract with a supplier, the debtor has the choice of
assuming the contract or rejecting it (which is treated as a prepetition breach under the Bankruptcy Code). 7 These are fundamental
and foundational principles of the Bankruptcy Code. Their purpose is
to impose a collective mechanism on creditors for the recovery of
their debts in order to avoid a piecemeal and destructive tearing apart
of the debtor. 78 A fundamental premise of bankruptcy law is that
individual creditors should not be left to their own pursuits in dealing
with the debtor.
These provisions of the Bankruptcy Code apply to and
govern every kind of contract and every non-debtor party, except
financial derivatives and the non-debtors on the other side of the
derivatives. Simply put, the normal and fundamental principles of
bankruptcy law do not apply when derivatives are involved.
The non-debtor counter-party to a derivative or
related financial instrument enjoys extraordinary
77

11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2006).

78 DOUGLAS

BANKRUPTCY:

G.

BAIRD, THOMAS

H.

JACKSON

&

CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS

BARRY

E.

20-30 (3d ed. rev.

2001).
When a debtor is insolvent and there are not
enough assets to satisfy everyone, the creditors are like
fishers in a small lake: Their actions collectively can
deplete and endanger the common pool. Each creditor has
an incentive to act precipitously because if it waits it may
not be repaid....
The situation in which the creditors find
themselves is much like an arms race among nations.
Money spent on weapons, of debt collection or war, is
better spent elsewhere if conflict can be avoided.
Bankruptcy law, like a peace treaty, can preempt conflict
and prevent waste. Under bankruptcy law, each creditor
receives what it could expect to receive outside of
bankruptcy, taking account of the possibility that it might
have won the race and the possibility that it might have
lost. As a group, creditors are better off because they do
not have to incur the costs associated with pursuing their
individual remedies. Their payoffs are also more certain,
something that has value in itself if the creditors are risk
averse.
Id. at 23.

ADLER,
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privileges if its counter-party files for bankruptcy.
Absent special protection, the derivative would be
subject to bankruptcy's automatic stay, which prohibits non-debtors from taking any action to enforce an
obligation against the debtor without court approval.
Bankruptcy also prevents most non-debtors from
invoking ipso facto clauses-provisions that make
bankruptcy a condition of default under the parties'
contracts. Derivatives are given special treatment in
both of these areas. Unlike other non-debtors, the
non-debtor participants in derivatives contracts are
permitted to enforce their rights without interference
from the bankruptcy process, due to a perception that
if enforcement were delayed, the collapse of an
important player in the derivatives markets could
have a contagious effect throughout the financial
markets.79
Commentators noted that the special treatment of derivatives
was greatly expanded when the Bankruptcy Code was amended by
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005 ("BAPCPA" or the "Act"):80
[BAPCPA] amends the Bankruptcy Code to clarify
and expand the existing policy of providing special
treatment for parties to financial markets contracts,
including securities contracts, futures contracts,
79 Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 68, at 1048-49. The special treatment of
derivatives with regard to the automatic stay is set forth in 11 U.S.C. §§
362(b)(6), (7), (17), (27) (2006). The special treatment of derivatives with
respect to ipsofacto clauses is set forth in II U.S.C. §§ 555-556, 559-561
(2006). An example of the pertinent language is found in § 556:
The contractual right of a commodity broker, financial
participant, or forward contract merchant to cause the
liquidation, termination, or acceleration of a commodity
contract ... or forward contract because of a condition of
the kind specified in section 365(e)(1) of this title ... shall

not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by operation
of any provision of this title or by the order of a court in
any proceeding under this title.
II U.S.C. § 556.
80 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.
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forward contracts, repurchase agreements, swaps and
related derivatives. That special treatment includes
exceptions from the automatic stay to permit setoff
and liquidation and exceptions from the avoiding
powers for certain kinds of prepetition payments.
The principal effect of the BAPCPA amendments is
to extend these "safe harbor" provisions to additional
parties and additional kinds of financial markets
contracts by expanding on the Code's definitions to
include new kinds of derivatives and new kinds of
transactions in them."
The broad and sweeping reach of the Act and its effect on derivatives
generated other scholarly commentary:
The reforms of 2005 yield important but subtle
changes in the Bankruptcy Code's treatment of
financial contracts. They might appear only to eliminate longstanding uncertainty surrounding the
protections available to financial contract counterparties, especially counterparties to repurchase
transactions and other derivatives contracts. But the
ambit of the reforms is much broader. The expanded
definitions-especially the definition of "swap
agreement"-are now so broad that nearly every
derivative contract is subject to the Code's protection. Instead of protecting particular counterparties
to particular transactions, the Code now protects any
counterparty to any derivatives contract. Entire
markets have been insulated from the costs of a
bankruptcy filing by a financial contract counter82
party.

8' Rhett G. Campbell, FinancialMarkets Contracts and BAPCPA, 79 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 696, 697 (2005).
82 Edward R. Morrison & Joerg

Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New

Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 641 (2005). The
commentators further highlighted how the definition of "swaps" in the Act
exempted the entire derivatives market from the automatic stay requirement:
Prior to 2005, the Code's protections were broad for
swaps (any counterparty received protection) and narrow
for other derivatives contracts (only some counterparties
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The overwhelming intent and effect of the Act was to carve out a
wide swathe of protection for derivatives, and to render them immune from the normal operation of bankruptcy law. The protections
extended to immunize the entire derivatives market:
A principal goal of the Act, then, is to expand
dramatically the range of protected financial
contracts. Entire derivatives markets are now
protected. The Act achieves this goal primarily
through definitions that are simply long lists of
financial products observed (now or in the future) in
financial markets. The virtue of this formalistic
approach is that it leaves little doubt about the
Code's boundaries: any transaction that bears the
formal markings of a swap, repo, forward, commodity contract, or securities contract is protected. It
is largely unnecessary for judges 83to analyze the
economics of particular transactions.
were protected). The Act obliterates this asymmetry,
principally by redefining "swap" to include, effectively,
all derivatives contracts. In so doing, the Code has moved
from protecting particular parties to protecting entire
markets.
Id. at 643.
The Reform Act radically reworks the Code's definitions,
expanding them to cover a broad range of transactions that
are or become common in financial markets. One of the
more important changes ...

is contained in the definition

of "swap agreement." In its new form, essentially all
derivatives have become "swap agreements;" all parties to
them, and all transfers under or in connection with them,
enjoy the Code's protections. For derivatives, at least, the
Act now offers financial market protection, a significant
departure from the old paradigm of protection for
particular parties.
Id. at 648.
13 Id. at 652-53.
These amendments do much more than simply expand the
list of protected swaps. They expand it to include virtually
every contract traded in derivatives markets, including
particular contracts-options, forwards, and certain
futures-that are given more limited protection elsewhere
in the Code. It is difficult to imagine a derivative that
would not be encompassed by section 101(53B). Equally
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The Act treats derivatives differently-and better-than almost all
other types of contracts. Parties that deal in derivatives were singled
out by Congress for special treatment unavailable to other parties
with contracts with bankrupt debtors:
Derivatives are essentially outside of this system.
Termination of a derivative is exempt from the
automatic stay. Ipsofacto clauses are enforceable in
the derivative context. And termination of derivative
contracts is expressly exempt from latter [sic] attack
as either a constructive fraudulent transfer or preference. Likewise, collateral provided as part of a
derivative transaction may be foreclosed upon
without concern that doing so violates the
Bankruptcy Code. 4
Derivatives have, to a large extent, been placed beyond the reach of a
bankruptcy judge's scrutiny. While other contracting parties must
seek judicial approval for their actions, the non-debtor parties to
derivative contracts may act without regard to the court. By
exempting any transaction that is a "swap agreement" from the reach
of normal Bankruptcy operations, the Act exempts the entire
derivatives market:
The 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code enhanced this special treatment by adding new section
561 that specifically preserves the contractual right
to terminate, liquidate, accelerate or offset under a
''master netting agreement" and across a broad range
of derivative contracts. . . . Indeed, it seems that
important, these amendments also extend the Code's
protections to every counterpartyto a derivatives contract
because the definition of "swap participant" remains
unchanged. It continues to encompass any entity that "at
any time before the filing of the petition, has an
outstanding swap agreement with the debtor." As a result,
the amendments to "swap agreement," move the Code
from protecting particular parties (to forwards and
commodity contracts) to protecting entire derivatives
markets.
Id. at 651.
14 Stephen J. Lubben, Derivatives and Bankruptcy: The Flawed Case for
Special Treatment, SSRN, at 10 (2009).
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every derivative instrument qualifies as a "swap
agreement" under the new amendments. Given that
virtually every conceivable derivative transaction is
now exempt from the automatic stay and the debtor's
power to assume and reject, this seems like overkill,
but plainly the industry wanted to make it very clear
that the bankruptcy court could not interfere with the
normal, non-bankruptcy operations of the derivatives
markets.85
So how does this benefit derivatives contracts, and how does
this relate to the discussion of specific relief? As a general matter, the
bankrupt debtor enjoys the powerful right to reject or assume
contracts. If a contract is rejected, under section 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code, the non-bankrupt party is generally left with an
86
unsecured claim for damages resulting from the rejection. In other
words, the debtor has the option of rejecting a contract and leaving
the counter-party with a claim for damages. This gives the debtor
party the ability to maximize the net present value of all of its
contractual obligations:
Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code can be then
seen as an extension of the classic concept of expectation damages and the more recent understandings
of the option to breach. Upon entering bankruptcy a
debtor-firm examines its contracts and decides which
ones have a negative net present value. The debtor
breaches these contracts, by rejecting them under
section 365, and assumes contracts that are
valuable. 7
This is generally true for contracts with a bankrupt debtor, with the
exception of derivatives contracts. The non-debtor counter-party to a
derivatives contract is protected from being left with a relatively
worthless claim for damages. Under the Bankruptcy Code, such
parties enjoy the right to specific relief:

85

[d. at 10-11.
16 See II U.S.C. § 365(g).
87 Lubben, supra note 84, at 15. This claim for damages is, of course, paid
with bankruptcy dollars, which will typically result in a distribution of a
small fraction of the total, allowed amount of the claim.
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This cherrypicking power comes to an end, however,
when the underlying contracts are derivatives contracts. Thanks to an exception from the automatic
stay, derivatives counterparties typically may terminate ongoing contracts when a debtor enters bankruptcy. Moreover, if a counterparty has entered
multiple derivatives contracts with the debtor, the
counterparty can set-off in-the-money contracts
against out-of-the-money contracts. (The process of
terminating and setting-off contracts is often termed
"close-out netting.") Finally, if a debtor posted
margin or other collateral to support its obligations
under these contracts, the counterparty is free to
seize it to the extent that the debtor is a net obligor to
the counterparty. In other words, thanks to an
exemption from the automatic stay, derivatives
counterparties can minimize their exposure to losses
arising from the insolvency of a debtor. If the debtor
has posted collateral sufficient to cover its obligations, the exemptions from the automatic stay effectively eliminate a counterparty's exposure to loss.88
Because of the exemptions of derivative contracts from the
Bankruptcy Code provisions that apply to contracts generally, parties
to derivatives contracts are able to reduce or even eliminate virtually
all exposure to losses.
A. The Stated Justifications for the Special Treatment of
Derivatives
Why do derivatives and the parties who deal in them enjoy
such special treatment? What is so special about derivatives that such
broad exemptions from the Bankruptcy Code were deemed necessary? The derivatives dealers pushed for the special treatment of
derivatives due to the asserted need to protect markets sensitive to
the delay and dislocation of bankruptcy. 89 And Congress accepted
this position:
If legislative history is to be credited, Congress
reasoned that special treatment of derivatives was
88 Edwards
89 Lubben,

& Morrison, supra note 62, at 95-96.
supra note 84, at 25.
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necessary to prevent the "insolvency of one commo-

dity firm from spreading to other brokers or clearing
agencies and possibly threatening the collapse of the
market." It believed that: "The prompt liquidation of
an insolvent's position is generally desirable to
minimize the potentially massive losses and chain
reaction of insolvencies that could occur if the
market were to move sharply in the wrong direction." Congress, then, carved derivatives out of the
scope of the automatic stay in order to reduce the
likelihood of systemic risk, i.e., the possibility that
the insolvency of a party to a derivatives contract
might expose a counterparty (such as a commercial
or investment bank) and that counterparty's counterparties (other banking institutions) to financial
distress, which would destabilize financial markets. 90
The legislative history makes clear that the Congressional proponents
of special treatment embraced the threat of systemic risk to justify
the treatment. The Financial Netting Improvements Act of 2006 was
described as a means to "amend banking, bankruptcy, and securities
laws related to the disposition of financial contracts in the event of
insolvency," and "to reduce the risk-especially the systemic risk
associated with activities in derivatives markets-that the failure of
one entity will disrupt and endanger financial markets." 91 One
Congressman stated that the legislation was necessary,

90 Edwards & Morrison, supra note 62, at 97-98.

9' H.R. REP. No. 109-648, pt. 1, at 2 (2006). This legislation amended,
among other provisions, 11 U.S.C. § 101(53B). Id. at 5. As for the definition
of systemic risk, one commentator observed:
A common factor in the various definitions of systemic
risk is that a trigger event, such as an economic shock or
institutional failure, causes a chain of bad economic
consequences sometimes referred to as a domino effect.
These consequences could include (a chain of) financial
institutions and/or market failures. Less dramatically,
these consequences might include (a chain of) significant
losses to financial institutions or substantial financialmarket price volatility. In either case, the consequences
impact financial institutions, markets, or both.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198 (2008).
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to prevent the failure of one entity from causing a
domino effect of more serious disruption, known as
systemic risk. Absent the adoption of these provisions with the growth in size of hedge funds and in
number of hedge funds, there is considerable market
uncertainty as to how a bankruptcy proceeding
would affect market liquidity . . . . [T]his [legislation] will provide a safe and secure mechanism to
unwind complex financial relationships, minimizing
market instability, providing market liquidity and
ensuring that our economic system is not adversely
impacted by the demise of a hedge fund.92
As described by the proponents, the legislation sounds like a
sensible, precautionary measure to prevent widespread financial
collapse.
Another perspective might suggest a different interpretation.
There could have been a hypothetically different situation where
Congress gave special treatment to derivatives because it did not
know how dangerous they could be. In such a situation, Congress
could claim the excuse that it never would have passed such laws if it
had only known the dangers. This excuse is clearly unavailable, as
evidenced by the legislative history. What is therefore remarkable is
that the Congressional proponents openly acknowledged the danger
posed by derivatives, and then took the position that derivatives need
special and favored treatment precisely because they are so
dangerous. 9 3 In hindsight, these statements of support have a Dr.
92

152 Cong. Rec. H8651 (2006) (statement of Rep. Baker). Other

representatives echoed this position as well. See, e.g., 152 Cong. Rec.
H7601 (2006) (statement of Rep. Wasserman Schultz).
9' The danger of derivatives was discussed by Warren Buffett, considered
by many to be the greatest investor of all time. Earlier this decade, Buffett
offered his view that derivatives are "time bombs, both for the parties that
deal in them and the economic system." BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2002
ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2003). He went on to add that "derivatives are
financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now
latent, are potentially lethal." Id. at 15.
Interestingly enough, the Bankruptcy Code does address in one
section the treatment of more commonly acknowledged forms of weapons
of mass destruction. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), which states that the
automatic stay does not apply to exercises of authority under the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
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Strangelove-type of feel to them. There was no effort to downplay or
mask the dangers of derivatives. Congressional representatives were
willing to go on record to say that these things are so dangerous as to
have the potential for blowing up the world, and that they should be
treated differently and better than other types of contracts. If nothing
else, this level of support is strong evidence of the political influence
exerted by the financial industry. What is also remarkable is the
absence of a forceful, countervailing view. If derivatives are so
dangerous, where was the legislation to tightly regulate or even ban
them? 94 It defies common sense to suggest that anything so dangerous as to pose the threat of systemic risk and global collapse should
receive favorable treatment and little regulatory oversight. 95 Yet, that
is exactly what happened.96
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Further on in §
362(b), subparagraphs (6), (7) and (27) state that the automatic stay does not
apply to derivatives. The obvious difference in treatment, however, is that
(b)(4) is designed to combat the use of chemical weapons, while (b)(6), (7)
and (27) are designed to encourage the use of derivatives.
94 The calls for tighter restrictions, and even outright bans, have emerged
since the collapse. For example, George Soros, a billionaire hedge fund
manager, has called for tighter regulation of credit default swaps and a ban
on certain types of such swaps. George Soros, One Way to Stop Bear Raids,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2009, at A17.
9' Intertwined with the notion of systemic risk is the phenomenon of "too
big to fail." This is the notion that some financial institutions are too big, too
important to fail. Such institutions are linked to most, if not all, major
financial institutions, and their collapse would trigger the collapse of every
other institution. These were the institutions that received government
bailouts in the depths of the crisis in 2008. Eric Dash, If It's Too Big to Fail,
Is it Too Big to Exist?, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2009, at WK.
The title of the just cited article seems like a reasonable, if not
obvious, question to ask regarding the institutions deemed too big to fail.
Yet, it appears that such a question was never considered by Congress as it
enacted legislation to favor the elite financial institutions. Congress knew it
was conferring special treatment on financial institutions and their
derivative products even though they posed the risk of triggering global
collapse. In a different reality, Congress might have acted in the following,
alternative manner:
An alternate approach is to deal with the problem before
crises emerge. On a routine basis, regulators could review
the largest and most connected firms in each industry, and
ask themselves essentially the same question that crisis
situations already force them to answer: 'Would the
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Derivatives

The stated (or pretextual) reason for special treatment of
derivatives is the need to avoid systemic risk. Yet, it is far from clear
whether the special treatment accomplishes that goal. Notable
sudden failure of this company generate intolerable
knock-on effects for the wider economy?' If the answer is
'yes,' the firm could be required to downsize, or shed
business lines in an orderly manner until regulators are
satisfied that it no longer poses a serious systemic risk.
Correspondingly, proposed mergers and acquisitions
could be reviewed for their potential to create an entity
that could not then be permitted to fail.
Duncan Watts, Too Complex to Exist, BOSTON GLOBE, June 14, 2009,
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2009/06/14/too complex
to exist.
96 Congress enacted other major legislation, as well, to remove regulatory
restrictions on derivatives. Until December 2000, many experts held the
opinion that credit default swaps were securities under the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act. William K. Sjostrom, The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 1, 37, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id 1346552).
The
enactment of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act ("CFMA") in
December 2000 unleashed the CDS market from any regulatory oversight or
restraint. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000). The CFMA contains several provisions that
were specifically designed to remove restrictions on credit default swaps.
For starters, it amended the definition of "security" in the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act to exclude "any security-based swap agreement." 15
U.S.C. §§ 77b-l(b)(1), 78c-1(b)(1) (2006). Among the excluded swap
agreements are credit default swaps. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c-1. One of New
York's top regulators told Congress:
The [CFMA], signed by President Clinton on December
21, 2000, created a 'safe harbor' [for credit default swaps]
by (1) preempting state and local gaming and bucket shop
laws except for general antifraud provisions, and (2)
exempting certain derivative transactions on commodities
and swap agreements, including credit default swaps,
from CFTC regulation.
Hearing to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. Economy:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 110th Cong. 4 (2008)
(statement of Eric Dinallo, Superintendent, New York State Insurance
Department).
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commentators have questioned this justification. Professors Partnoy
and Skeel have offered their view: "It is far from clear that the
[special treatment of derivatives] reduces systemic risk; it may even
increase this risk because it eliminates a possible curb on counterparties' rush to close out their contracts in the event of a wave of
failures. 97 Professors Edwards and Morrison share this deep
skepticism:
While Congress' concern with systemic risk
is understandable, its decision to address it through
the Bankruptcy Code is deeply puzzling. At the very
least, the language of the Code encompasses far too
many transactions. Fear of systemic risk is warranted
only in cases involving the insolvency of a major
financial market participant, with whom other firms
have entered derivatives contracts of massive value
and volume. Yet the Code offers special treatment to
derivatives no matter how large or small the
counterparty. Thus, Congress' stated justification
for the special treatment is incomplete, as it applies
only to a fraction of all firms that enter into derivatives contracts.
At the same time, the Code's special treatment of derivatives contracts seems far too narrow.
Fear of systemic risk justifies special treatment of a
broad range of financial market transactions and
participants, especially commercial banks. Indeed,
fear of systemic risk originated in the banking sector,
yet a bank cannot seize collateral whenever a debtor
firm enters bankruptcy. Surely the risks that (apparently) motivated Congress' concern with derivatives
are equally present when Enron, WorldCom, or
United Airlines enters bankruptcy and, say, Chase
Manhattan cannot collect its collateral (if it is a
secured creditor) or expects only a few cents on the
dollar (if it is unsecured) when the case concludes
several years later. Yet nothing in the Code allows
Chase to collect its collateral; nothing in the Code
97 Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 68, at 1049. In challenging the special
treatment of derivatives, Partnoy and Skeel argue, among other things, that
counter-parties should not be permitted to invoke ipso facto clauses. Id. at
1050.
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gives Chase or any other bank priority in payment
when the case concludes. If systemic risk arises from
transactions other than derivatives contracts, as it
undoubtedly does, the Code's 98 singular focus on
derivatives contracts is puzzling.
Edwards and Morrison conclude their analysis with this observation:
The real lesson ... is that the systemic risk rationale
for exempting derivatives contracts does not make
much sense. A Bankruptcy Code exemption for
derivatives offers little help in alleviating the
potential systemic risk associated with the
insolvency of a large derivatives counterparty . . .
and may even exacerbate or create a systemic risk.99
If there is such doubt as to whether the special treatment of
derivatives actually achieves Congress' stated goal to reduce
systemic risk, then why was this treatment extended? Congress may
simply disagree with the doubters, or, perhaps, Congress was
misguided as to the effects of the legislation. Another possibility is
that avoidance of systemic risk (while a legitimate concern) was a
pretext for larger motives and justifications.
VIII.

The Protection of Status and Wealth Through Specific
Relief

The common feature between feudal land contracts and
financial derivatives is that specific relief is thought necessary to
protect the parties. But, going back to the original question, is this
mere coincidence or do they share something in common that creates
the asserted need for specific relief? In order to determine the
answer, can one simply rely on the stated reasons (land is unique, and
systemic risk must be avoided), or is there a need to look for an
explanation elsewhere? One commentator described the need to look
beyond the immediately apparent:
Perhaps courts have failed to articulate the
considerations that enlighten the choice between
equitable and damage remedies because, as the
reader has learned, it is a difficult, if not impossible
98 Edwards & Morrison, supra note 62, at 98-99.
99

Id. at 106.
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task. A series of shadowy and overlapping
economic, moral and administrative criteria compete
for attention. In a vital society, certainty and
definiteness are illusory. In fashioning rules for a
particular controversy or for a healthy future,
policymakers may conclude that in certain instances,
specific relief will vindicate an important interest
better than damages. Some interests worth
recognizing are speculative and conjectural, and are
too difficult to valuate. Some interests may be both
noneconomic and impalpable, while others are
simply too important to be valued only in money.
The remedy, however, often fails to comport with
the substance of the interest.' 00
The key point is that specific relief is granted in order to promote
policies that are not necessarily acknowledged in the expressed
reasons justifying the relief. 10 1
In searching for other possible reasons for specific relief, a
helpful starting point is to return to the principle that specific relief is
viewed as necessary when money damages are inadequate. This
raises the question: Why are money damages inadequate for the
contract at issue? For feudal land contracts, the answer is more
evident. The land itself defined the relationship between the lord and
the feudatory, with all of the attendant benefits and duties.
Additionally, before the rise of industry and commerce, land was
wealth (including the rents from land). There appears to have been no
substitute for land's wealth and rent generation. More importantly,
there was no market mechanism to put a monetary value on the status
conferred by land. This is the situation that gave rise to the familiar
maxim that specific performance is available when money damages
are inadequate, and, of course, damages are inadequate when the loss
cannot be estimated with sufficient certainty. 10 2 In pre-industrial
England, what else existed that could
rival the rent-generating nature
10 3
of land and the status it conferred?
Rendleman, supranote 19, at 358.
101Laycock, supra note 6, at 726-27.
100

102 FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS,

supranote 7, § 12.6, at 746-47.

The protection of land contracts in feudal England also reflects the
reality that law is, at its foundation, a conservative system. It is conservative
in the sense that the law tends to protect the status quo, and hesitates to
103
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Implicit in this discussion of contract remedies for land in
pre-industrial England is the need to examine the relationship of the
contract to the market. A general summary of the law would be that
damages are available when there is a market from which valuation
of damages may be ascertained, and that specific relief is necessary
when there is no such market. From an economist's viewpoint, every
economic good has substitutes, and the market provides a means to
determine those substitutes. 10 4 By declaring the "uniqueness" of
some contracts, the law is acknowledging the absence of a market to
conduct a valuation of the contractual loss. Another and compatible
reason is that specific relief is used to shelter some contracts from the
forces of the market. Why are some contracts deemed to be so
special as to be immune from market forces? The answer lies in
considering the antithesis to market forces-status.
In its purest sense, status is a relationship, or web of relationships, based on immutable characteristics. 15 An example would be
blood ties within a family or tribe. 10 6 Status is then further refined
through more particularized immutable characteristics, such as age or
gender, and such status commonly formed the basis of, and
upset the existing order. This makes sense. Law is made by those with
power, legal systems are administered by elites, and it is in their interest to
preserve their privileged situation, not overturn it. Specific relief serves this
purpose because it prevents harm from occurring in the first place, as
opposed to damages, which attempt to provide a remedy after the harm has
occurred. See Laycock, supra note 6, at 689.
104 Kronman, supra note 3, at 359.
105 This view of the status of status is derived from the discussion of status
in HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 168-70 (Transaction Publishers
2002) (1861). This view is consistent with the writings of contemporary
scholars. As observed by Professor Carriere: Status refers "to attributes
'inherent in the person,' over which 'private individuals have no power ....
They cannot alter or dispose of such attributes by agreements, at their
pleasure, as they can do with their property."' Jeanne Louise Carriere, From
Status to Person in Book I, Title I of the Civil Code, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1263,
1270 (1998) (quoting I PLANIOL & RIPERT, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW
(La. L. Inst. trans., 12th ed. 1959)). Similarly, a leading treatise stated that
status is used with reference to "those comparatively few classes of persons
in the community who, by reason of their conspicuous differences from
normal persons, and the fact that by no decision of their own can they get
rid of these differences, require separate consideration in an account of the
law." EDWARD JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 109 (P.B. Fairest ed.,
6th
ed. 1967).
106
MAINE, supra note 105.
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determined, legal and social positions within a society. This explains
why many ancient societies were led by male elders. The inherent
nature of status meant that status could not be purchased. One cannot
purchase age or a blood relationship. Thus, a system based on status
is the antithesis of a system based on the market. Because status is
not purchased on the market, there is only a limited role for contracts
in a status system. Contracts are the mechanism by which market
transactions are effected. If something cannot be the subject of a
market transaction, there is no need for contract.
These observations have interesting implications for the
discussion concerning land contracts and derivatives. Specific relief
may be necessary because there is no market to determine the value
of the subject of the breached contract. Because there was no market
for the status based on land in feudal times, it is understandable why
specific performance was viewed as the appropriate remedy. But
even if a market determination is available, policymakers may decide
that the contract should not be subject to market forces. Thus,
specific relief may be used to remove the determination of contract
losses from the test of the market. To the extent specific relief is used
in this manner, it means that the type of contract at issue is removed
from a judicial determination of value.
This is the treatment now accorded to derivatives contracts,
as shown in In re National Gas Distributors.10 7 One conclusion from
107 556 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2009). National Gas Distributors, LLC (the

debtor) was a distributor of natural gas, which entered into contracts with
certain customers under which it was obligated to supply natural gas at a
fixed price. Id. at 250-51. The purpose of the contracts was to protect the
customers from price fluctuations. Id. at 251. The bankruptcy trustee
commenced adversary proceedings to avoid the contracts, arguing that the
contracts were fraudulent conveyances because the contracts were made for
less than market value. Id. The customers moved to dismiss, arguing that the
contracts were "swap agreements," a type of derivatives contract, and that
they therefore had a complete defense under the Bankruptcy Code Id. at
250; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(g), 548(c), 548(d)(2)(D) (2006). The
bankruptcy judge ruled in favor of the trustee. In re National Gas
Distributors, 556 F.3d at 250. He ruled that the contracts were simply
contracts to purchase a commodity, and not a swap agreement because they
were insufficiently related to the financial markets. Id. at 260-61.
The resolution of the issue depended on whether the contracts were
"commodity forward agreements" because I I U.S.C. § 101(53B) defines
"swap agreement" to include commodity forward agreements. Id. at 257.
The bankruptcy judge ruled that the contracts did not fall within that
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this case is that form prevails over substance when derivatives are
involved. If a party to a contract calls it a derivative, then it is a
derivative, and any attempt by a seasoned bankruptcy judge to
determine the true substance of the contract will be severely limited.
Thus, the statutory treatment of derivatives sharply curtails any
judicial role regarding the operation of the contract. There is only an
extremely limited role for the court to determine or value loss. Third
party scrutiny of the contract is virtually eliminated. The ruling in
National Gas demonstrates that the financial industry obtained the
legislation (and the judicial outcomes) it wanted.
By saying that some contracts are not appropriate for marketbased scrutiny, the law is in a sense elevating such contracts to the
level of status. Another way to put it is that the proponents of such
treatment seek to remove their contracts from a market determination
of value. This explains why contracts for land, the embodiment of
status in pre-industrial England, were protected by specific relief.
The loss of land could not be determined by the market. In that
society, as constructed, there was no market mechanism to value land
category because "'commodity forward agreements' must be 'regularly the
subject of trading' in financial markets and must be settled by financial
exchanges of differences in commodity prices, whereas the contracts in this
case were directly negotiated between the seller and purchaser and
contemplated physical delivery of the commodity to the purchasers." Id.
251-52.
The Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground that the lower court's
interpretation of "commodity forward agreement" was too narrow, and
remanded the matter for further determination as to whether the contracts
fell within that category. In so ruling, the appellate court observed:
Indeed, [Congress'] repetitive generalized comments
about protecting financial markets from the instability that
bankruptcy proceedings might cause and the potpourri of
agreements included in the term "swap agreement" barely
distinguish any major commercial contract from a swap
agreement.
Moreover, the policies informing these provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are often in tension. Even
though an overarching policy of the Bankruptcy Code is
to provide equal distribution among creditors (citation
omitted) in enacting 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(g) and
548(d)(2)(D), Congress intended to serve a countervailing
policy of protecting financial markets and therefore
favoring an entire class of instruments and participants.
Id. at 258.
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and its related status. The purest form of status is something that does
not have a market price, and land was the tangible expression of that
form. 0 8 Thus, specific relief was the only available means to address
a breach of contract.
The situation for derivatives is obviously different, and yet,
the role of status plays a key role. The treatment of derivatives in
bankruptcy may be viewed in two ways. First, because the nondebtor parties are able to "net-out" their derivatives, it may be said
that derivatives are largely protected from the market mechanism of
valuing the loss. Derivatives dealers successfully sought to avoid this
valuation because holding an unsecured claim for damages does not
come close to recovering the full amount of the loss. An alternative
and polar way to view it is to say that, in the event of bankruptcy, the
market mechanism for compensating the loss has failed. All that is
left for the non-debtor party is a dysfunctional market that is only
capable of paying compensation in relatively worthless bankruptcy
dollars. In this situation, the derivatives dealers can claim that the
market mechanism is inadequate for valuing their loss, and that
specific relief is necessary. 10 9 Either way, the derivatives dealers are
no longer subject to a market determination of their loss. Their
contracts are treated as if they occupy a position of status such that
they should be protected from market forces. What they have
managed to accomplish is the treatment of their contracts as if they
are on the same plane as feudal land contracts. This has created a
genuinely privileged position. This is not some mere symbolic
benefit. This results in an actual transfer of wealth to the financial
elite:
The Code reduces the transaction costs of hedging
risk by placing derivatives counterparties ahead of
other creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. Counterparties are free to cancel executory contracts and
seize collateral while other contractual partners are
108

Because true status is viewed as something that cannot be purchased, the

pre-existing elite of any given era has always been appalled at the ability of
the nouveaux riches to buy the trappings or badges of status. But then, the
nouveaux riches eventually become the prevailing elite, and they in turn
become appalled by the next wave of arrivistes who mimic their status. This
replacement of elites by new waves of elites is an underlying theme of this
paper.
109 Of course, every non-debtor contracting party may make the same
argument, but only the derivatives players have the law on their side.
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vulnerable to cherry-picking and other secured creditors must bear some of the costs of the bankruptcy
proceedings (including delay in accessing collateral).
The Code, then, redistributes wealth from
ordinary
110
creditors to derivatives counterparties.
The role of status in society is obviously weaker today than it
was 500 years ago in that immutable characteristics (as a general
rule) no longer determine social and legal position, and the elite of
the landed nobility has been replaced by successive waves of new
elite groups. A common thread, however, is the protection and
preservation of status (or the creation of status-like position) through
specific relief. Pure status, which cannot be altered through the
market or by contract, is the antithesis of a relationship that may be
altered through contract. Henry Maine described this process in the
development of societies as a progress from status to contract.'' As
societies modernized, people were allowed greater freedom to
change their relationships with one another through mutual consent
and the exercise of individual autonomy.' 2 Thus, relationships were
no longer rigidly determined by immutable characteristics. Relationships once based on status became mutable through contract.

Edwards & Morrison, supra note 62, at 118 (emphasis added).
MAINE, supra note 105.
12 This may explain why personal service contracts are not enforceable
through specific performance. Courts do not want to impose an order
creating a situation that resembles involuntary servitude. FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS, supra note 7, § 12.7, at 755. involuntary servitude or slavery,
in its most extreme form, is a status relationship. Slaves did not become
slaves through the exercise of individual autonomy, and they were usually
unable to contract their way out of slavery. Thus, the law of contracts does
not want to impose a remedy that is the antithesis of contract. Because the
law of contracts is about the exercise of individual autonomy, individuals
should be able to choose between honoring their contracts and breaching
their contracts (subject to a damages remedy). They should not have a status
imposed on them because of a contract. This explains why personal services
contracts are not specifically enforced.
This is more than an idle observation, because the irony surrounding the treatment of financial derivatives is that those who have
attained their exalted position through contract are attempting to preserve
their position through an imposition of status barriers, which prevent
contracts-based challenges to their position.
110

III
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Most would hail this progress as a welcome development.
However, change produces winners and losers, and this type of
progress produced an obvious set of losers. The rise of commerce
and industry meant the end of social dominance by the landed
aristocracy, who could not keep up with the accumulation of wealth
by the new elite of the industrial age." 3 Today, the dominance of
industrial fortunes has been eclipsed by the dominance of the new
wealth generated by the new elite in finance.
The rise of each new wave of successive elites was made
possible by the weakening of status as the determinant of social
position. What is ironic, however, is that each new set of elites seeks
to impose new status restrictions in order to keep outsiders from
breaching their privileged positions.' 14 The new elites maintain their
defense of their exalted position until the defense is breached by the
newest wave of elites, who then (like their predecessors) attempt to
resurrect status barriers to new challengers.
The modern barriers, however, are not the pure form of
status-status based on immutable characteristics. They cannot be
the pure form because the new elite group attained its position in a
113It

may be an overstatement that the pre-existing elite loses its exalted

role. An alternative view may be that the old elite absorbs or co-opts the
new elite, which eagerly embraces the approval and trappings of the old
elite. This would explain the penchant of new money to mimic the lifestyle
of a bygone landed aristocracy through dress, manner and consumer
consumption.
114And what happens to those groups who do not attain such elite status?
An interesting comparison to the special treatment of the financial industry
and their derivatives is the treatment of collective bargaining agreements
under the Bankruptcy Code. Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code explicitly
provides for the right of the debtor to reject a collective bargaining
agreement. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2006). This provides a stark example of the
respective roles of finance and labor in our society.
In a different type of society, Congressional representatives would
propose legislation prohibiting the rejection of collective bargaining
agreements in bankruptcy. They would cite the need to protect the rights of
labor, and might even raise the possibility of systemic risk due to labor
unrest in the event of rejected agreements.
This article does not assert that such a world would be more
desirable than the actual one where financial interests are favored. The point
of this hypothetical illustration is to show that there is nothing inherent in
social forces that made the favorable treatment of derivatives an inevitable
outcome. Alternative outcomes are hypothetically available. Our society
chose the outcome in favor of finance.
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world based on contract, not status. The new elite arrived in their
position because individuals are permitted to alter their social
position through market mechanisms. This is particularly true for the
financial elite, whose entire claim to position is based on free market
ideology. Thus, they cannot claim their position on the basis of an
immutable quality, such as direct descent from a sun god. They must,
instead, rely on diluted forms of status, which carry the impression
that the status may not be purchased. 115 One form of such status
would be the kind erected by political power or protection-the
ability to create, preserve and protect status through political means:
The great consolidations of banking and investment
banking into financial mega-players has proliferated
armies of mega-income executives. Besides driving
cash income shares toward the top of the payroll
115

Modem day examples would include the hiring practices of elite

financial institutions and law firms to concentrate their recruitment on those
with "prestigious" educational qualifications. Thus, a degree from an elite
institution is a form of diluted status (except for legacy admits who may
represent a pure form of status based on birthright). Those who possess such
degrees like to believe that they cannot be purchased, but are rather a badge
of innate qualities. Whether that is true, or whether such institutions are
simply mechanisms to perpetuate already existing class and status hierarchies is an open question.
By definition, any exclusive group is one that is closed to
outsiders-those deemed not up to snuff by the group's members. The irony
that is apparently lost on newly-arrived exclusive groups (with the exception
of archaic holdovers such as European nobility or Mayflower descendants,
which is not to suggest that they are or are not able to appreciate irony) is
that privileged positions in contemporary society are attainable because
contract, not status, permits social mobility. Yet, once a privileged group
attains a desired position, it then resorts to newly-invented forms of status
(at least, diluted forms) to ensure that others may not resort to contract to
join the privileged group. This type of behavior was observed by one
financial reporter:
When bankers talk about derivatives, they delight in
swathing the concept in complex jargon. That complexity
makes the world of derivatives opaque, which serves
bankers' interests just fine. Opacity reduces scrutiny and
confers power on the few with the ability to pierce the
veil. But though derivatives have indeed become horribly
complex, in actuality, they are as old as the idea of finance
itself.
TETT, supranote 71, at 9.
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pyramid, it has greatly enhanced the political clout
of Wall Street-as evidenced by steady cuts in taxes
on capital gains and dividends and the persistence of
absurd tax advantages for private equity funds." 6
The powerful lobby continues its efforts to block legislative measures to impose additional regulation because additional regulation
means smaller profits.1 17 More significantly, this political clout has
been used to carve out protection from the workings of a free market:
The reason for the permanent advantage of financial
services is that they don't really compete in free
markets. They earn high profits because they take
big risks, as evidenced by their very high degree of
leverage compared to other industries. In truly free
markets, however, periods of high risks and high
profits are offset by periods of large losses. But in
financial services, although the high profits accrue to
managers and shareholders, their losses are usually
partly socialized. 118
This is the classic "heads I win, tails you lose" situation. During the
boom years, financial firms, and many individuals within them,
enjoyed mind-boggling profits and compensation. When the bust
occurred, the profits and compensation were not returned. Instead of
exclusively bearing the losses (like the exclusive enjoyment of the
rewards), the losses of the financial industry were socialized in that
the federal government, and the American taxpayer had to step in to
bail out the collapsed firms.11 9
116 MORRIS, supra note 42, at 155.
u7 See Gretchen Morgenson & Don Van Natta, Jr., In Crisis, Banks Dig In
,forFightAgainst Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2009, at Al.
118 MORRIS, supra note 42, at 153.
119 According to some estimates, the cost of the bailout to the taxpayer is
over $23 trillion. Ronald D. Oral, Bank Rescue Could Cost $23.7 Trillion,
Says Bailout Overseer, MARKETWATCH, July 20, 2009, http://www.
marketwatch.com/story/us-fmancial-rescue-tab-pegged-at-24-trillion. Now,
the elite financial institutions have returned to paying record compensation.
As of July 2009, they are set to pay as much as, or even more than, the
amounts they paid before the economic collapse in 2008. Tomoeh
Murakami Tse, Wall Street Jacks Up Pay After Bailouts, CAPITAL TIMES,
July 23, 2009, http://www.madison.com/tct/news/stories/459370. Thus, the
losses are borne by the taxpaying public, while the rewards are enjoyed by
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Conclusion

The economic collapse has created shock waves of losses
around the world. Yet, the elite financial interests seem to have
emerged stronger than ever, while most everyone else is left to pick
up the pieces. 20 Attempts at reform are being considered in
an elite few, and the good times have returned for those fortunate few.
"Investment banks, of all things, are making serious money again, thanks in
part to government aid. Ironically, they are benefiting from the crisis they
helped to create. As profits go up, so do salaries-only this time, it's the
taxpayers who are shouldering the risks." Frank Hornig, Christoph Pauly &
Wolfgang Reuter, Banks Reopen Global Casino, DER SPIEGEL, July 28,
2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,638732,00.html.
New York's Attorney General investigated the compensation
practices of the leading financial institutions and concluded in a July 2009
report: "Thus, when the banks did well, their employees were paid well.
When the banks did poorly, their employees were paid well. And when the
banks did very poorly, they were bailed out by taxpayers and their
employees were still paid well." Andrew M. Cuomo, No Rhyme or Reason:
The 'Heads I Win, Tails You Lose' Bank Bonus Culture, http://www.
oag.state.ny.us/media center/2009/july/pdfs/Bonus%20Report%20Final%2
07.30.09.pdf. In light of the fact that exorbitant bonuses were paid after the
government bailout of the banks, Mr. Cuomo reportedly asked: "Ifthe bank
lost money, where do you get the money to pay the bonus?" Louise Story &
Eric Dash, Bankers Reaped Lavish Bonuses During Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 2009, at Al. An example of this phenomenon is the controversy
surrounding the payment of a $100 million bonus to one trader employed by
Citigroup, which received $45 billion in taxpayer aid. David Segal, $100
Million Payday Poses Problemfor Pay Czar, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2009, at
Al.
The further irony regarding this socialization of losses is that the
derivatives players succeeded in exempting themselves from the collective
mechanism of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, where the law imposes a
collective remedy, the derivatives players carved out an exemption for
themselves because acting collectively did not benefit them and they stood
to gain from individualized, special treatment. On the other hand, when it
comes to losses in the market (which are usually borne individually), they
managed to spread the losses away from themselves.
This is also an example of moral hazard, because the lesson to be
drawn is that those who engage in risky and destructive behavior will not
bear the consequences of their actions. This will only encourage more
behavior of this kind.
120 Professor Partnoy believes this is a recurring story: "I believe derivatives
are the most recent example of a basic theme in the history of finance: Wall
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Congress. Yet, it is clear that lawmakers are too late. Where were
these attempts and concerns in 2006, or any other time? 121 Seemingly
laudable reasons were presented to justify the special treatment of
derivatives, but perhaps the special treatment was conferred just
because some players' money is indeed more important than others.
A debtor in a large bankruptcy case may have thousands of contractual counter-parties. Yet, a special few, the derivatives players, are
treated in a way that runs counter to the fundamental policies of the
Bankruptcy Code.
Moreover, there is an element of a "seat of the pants" and a
rushed ad hoc approach to reform. Lawmakers are attempting to fix
the problem after the fact without a full understanding of how the
problem came into existence in the first place. The purpose of this
article is to suggest that the existence of broader and unrecognized
factors in the treatment of derivatives and the financial sector. If one
accepts the view that status and the creation or preservation of status
play a role in why derivatives are accorded such special treatment,
then recognition of this possibility might lead policymakers to think
about the real reasons why certain parties want or deserve special
treatment (although it is undoubtedly naYve to believe that reasoned
discourse can counterbalance waves of lobbying and campaign
contribution money). The point is that it seems most people, at least
in America, would agree that status should not conclusively
determine social position or privilege. Indeed, this concept is
enshrined in the Constitution. 122 The next time another group argues
that they are entitled to specific treatment (in this instance, in the
form of specific relief) when others are not, policymakers might be
guided by considering the role of status, and whether that is a
desirable policy to pursue.

Street bilks Main Street. Since the introduction of money thousands of years
ago, financial intermediaries with more information have been taking
advantage of lenders and borrowers with less." PARTNOY, supra note 1, at
269.
121Instead of reining in the danger, Congress elevated the derivatives
dealers to a position ahead of everyone else. This observation is not unique
to this article. "A cynic might argue that the financial safe harbors are
indeed a 'bankruptcy opt-out clause' for a certain class of capitalists
because their money is more important than everyone else's." Campbell,
supra note 81, at 712.

122 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (prohibiting the granting of titles of

nobility).

